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Criminal Law
by Franklin J. Hogue*
and Laura D. Hogue
I.

INTRODUCTION

We have culled through the most important criminal cases of this
reporting period' and selected those that resulted in changes to criminal
case law that will likely have an effect upon the way prosecutors and
defense attorneys approach criminal cases in Georgia.
II.

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO
PROBATION CASES

In the case of State v. Thackston,2 Hulon Thackston was a probationer
in Douglas County. In March 2007, he was stopped in Paulding County;
his car was searched, and he was charged with possession of methamphetamine. In October 2007, Douglas County issued a probation
violation warrant. When law enforcement showed up at Thackston's

* Partner in the law firm of Hogue & Hogue, LLP, Macon, Georgia; Faculty, National
Criminal Defense College; Adjunct Faculty, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of
Law. Atlanta Christian College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1980); Emmanuel School of
Religion (M.A., summa cum laude, 1983); Georgia State University (M.A., summa cum
laude, 1988); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1991).
Member, State Bar of Georgia; President-Elect, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers; Member, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
** Partner in the law firm of Hogue & Hogue, LLP, Macon, Georgia; Faculty, National
Criminal Defense College; Adjunct Faculty, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of
Law. Columbus College (B.A., cum laude, 1986); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1991). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Former
Chair, Amicus Committee, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Member,
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
1. This Survey chronicles developments in Georgia criminal law from June 1, 2010 to
May 31, 2011. For an analysis of Georgia criminal law during the prior survey period, see
Franklin J. Hogue & Laura D. Hogue, Criminal Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 62
MERCER L. REv. 87 (2010).
2. No. S10G1337, 2011 WL 2118928 (Ga. May 31, 2011).
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apartment to arrest him, they saw methamphetamine on a table. They
acquired a search warrant and found more methamphetamine and some
drug paraphernalia.
Thackston moved to suppress the drug evidence in the new Paulding
County case. The Superior Court of Douglas County, Georgia, granted
that motion on the grounds that the drugs found in the apartment
"constituted fruit of the poisonous tree" from the bad traffic stop
search.' Paulding County then dismissed its case. Thackston filed a
plea in bar in the Douglas County probation revocation case, arguing
that collateral estoppel prevented Douglas County from contesting the
successful motion to suppress, based upon the same searches, in
Paulding County. The trial court agreed, and the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed.'
The Georgia Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals,
declaring, for the first time in Georgia, that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to a probation revocation hearing.' The court observed that
the United States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test when
deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to a context other than
a criminal trial.'
On the one side, the exclusion may deter law
enforcement from trampling on citizens' right to privacy.' On the other
side of the scale are the costs of withholding information in the process
of seeking the truth.?
The Georgia Supreme Court weighed these two concerns and looked
at the results of this balancing test in several other jurisdictions, taking
into account the purpose of probation, which is to promote rehabilitation
and integration back into society, and concluded that
[blecause application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation
proceedings would achieve only marginal deterrent effects and would
significantly alter and affect the proper administration of the probation
system in this state, we find the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary
rule do not outweigh the costs to the system. Therefore, under the
proper balancing test, neither the federal nor state constitutions
require application of the exclusionary rule in state probation
revocation proceedings.o

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7. Id. at *2 (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1987)).
8.
9.
10.

See id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
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MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS

In Adams v. State,n Mitchell Lee Adams was indicted and convicted
for the crimes of aggravated child molestation and child molestation
against a toddler.12 Pursuant to the mandatory sentencing provisions
of section 16-6-4(d)(1) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A. ),13 Mitchell was sentenced to life imprisonment for aggravated
child molestation, the first twenty-five years of the sentence to be served
in prison without the benefit of parole and the remainder of his life to
be spent on probation.14 Mitchell was twelve years old at the time the
indicted offenses were alleged to have occurred." The Georgia Supreme Court considered two constitutional challenges to Mitchell's
sentence: (1) a challenge to the constitutionality of the mandatory
sentencing provision, as applied to a fourteen-year-old, and (2) whether
Mitchell could have been too young to be prosecuted as an adult."
As a matter of first impression, the court considered the constitutionality of the mandatory sentencing provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(dXl), as
applied to a minor." Adams propounded an Eighth Amendment"
challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence, asserting that such a
sentence constituted "cruel and unusual punishment as applied to
him."" The court noted that during the time that Adams's appeal was
pending, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Graham
20
which held that the Eighth Amendment to the United
v. Florida,
States Constitution "prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide."" As
Adams's sentence provided for his eventual reentry into society-albeit
after twenty-five years-unlike a life without parole sentence, the court
found no categorical Eighth Amendment violation, turning instead to an
analysis of whether Adams's sentence was "grossly disproportionate" to

11. 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (2011).
12. Id. at 695-96, 707 S.E.2d at 361. The actual age of the victim was never clear from
the record, though the supreme court's best guess was that she was around four years old.
Id. at 704 n.3, 707 S.E.2d at 367 n.3 (Hunstein, C.J., concurring specially).
13. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(d)(1) (2011).
14. Adams, 288 Ga. at 696, 707 S.E.2d at 361 (majority opinion).
15. Id. at 704, 707 S.E.2d at 367 (Hunstein, C.J., concurring specially).
16. Id. at 696, 707 S.E.2d at 361-62 (majority opinion).
17. Id. at 696, 707 S.E.2d at 361.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19. Adams, 288 Ga. at 700, 707 S.E.2d at 364.
20. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
21. Adams, 288 Ga. at 700-01, 707 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034).
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his crime.2 The court noted that sentencing was a job for the legislative branch of government, and that the judiciary must defer to the
discretion of the legislature "unless the sentence imposed shocks the
conscience."2 3 The court determined that the evidence presented at
trial was that Adams committed numerous acts of molestation upon a
young child, including acts of sodomy, which, in their minds, did not
make his sentence grossly disproportional to his crime; therefore, the
court rejected Adams's Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence.24
Additionally, the court addressed the applicability of the juvenile's
challenge to his prosecution, as it may have resulted in his being
illegally prosecuted for offenses that occurred before he had reached the
age of thirteen.25 Under Georgia law, a child under the age of thirteen
"shall not be considered or found guilty of a crime."2 The indictment
under which Adams was prosecuted listed a range of dates for the
criminal behavior, all involving time frames during which Adams would
have been at least thirteen years old." But at trial, "Adams moved for
a directed verdict, arguing that the State failed to prove that the crimes
occurred during the period of time set forth in the indictment." 28 The
trial court ruled that the dates set forth in the indictment were not
essential elements of the charging document, thereby instructing the
jury that the State would have met their burden of proof so long as the
evidence supported a finding that the charged offenses were committed
at any time within the applicable seven-year statute of limitations.2
The ruling was an appropriate one, except that it now opened up the
possible time frame for the commission of those offenses to a time when
Adams could have been less than thirteen years old and, therefore,
ineligible for adult prosecution. Consequently, before sentencing, Adams
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. 0 The majority of the supreme
court held that the burden of production of evidence supporting the
affirmative defense of "infancy" lay upon the defendant, "unless the

22. Id. at 696, 701, 707 S.E.2d at 361, 365 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 702, 707 S.E.2d at 365 (quoting Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675, 676, 631 S.E.2d
675, 677 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 696, 707 S.E.2d at 361-62.
26. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-1 (2011).
27. Adams, 288 Ga. at 695, 707 S.E.2d at 361.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 695-96, 707 S.E.2d at 361.
30. Id. at 696, 707 S.E.2d at 361-62.
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[S]tate's evidence raised the issue."" Finding that the record from the
trial did not demonstrate that appellant's age was proven, the defense
bore the burden of producing such evidence in order to properly raise an
infancy challenge, and the defense failed to do so; therefore, the
challenge was not properly asserted. 2
Justice Hunstein, joined by Justice Melton, concurred specially to the
majority's conclusion that infancy must be raised as an affirmative
defense in order not to waive it.33 The concurrence asserted that the
legislature's proscription against adult prosecution of children-those
persons under the age of thirteen-is a mandate and not an affirmative
defense.3 Justice Hunstein wrote,
I would hold that a child under the age of 13 who commits a criminal
offense is no more able to "waive" the legal bar to prosecution set forth
in [O.C.G.A.] § 16-3-1 than a defendant who commits a capital offense
when under the age of 18 can "waive" the constitutional proscription
against the execution of a death sentence."
Justice Hunstein's opinion was a concurrence, however, because under
the record evidence she concluded that there was no possibility that the
jury's guilty verdict reflected any behavior committed by Mitchell Adams
before he turned thirteen years old.3 ' Nevertheless, the concurring
opinion cautioned prosecutors to take care in drafting indictments to
avoid "any possibility" of the jury resting a verdict upon acts or
omissions that occurred before the accused had reached the age of
thirteen."
IV

THE REPETITIVE OBJECTION RULE FOR SIMILAR TRANSACTION
EVIDENCE

In Whitehead v. State," the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously
abandoned its "unusual" rule concerning the preservation of challenges
to similar transaction evidence. 9 In the 1998 case of Young v. State,0

31. Id. at 697, 707 S.E.2d at 362-63 (quoting Cheesman v. State, 230 Ga. App. 525, 528,
497 S.E.2d 40, 44 (1998)); see also O.C.G.A. § 16-1-3(1) (2011).
32. Adams, 288 Ga. at 697-98, 707 S.E.2d at 362-63.
33. Id. at 703, 707 S.E.2d at 366 (Hunstein, C.J., concurring specially).
34. Id. at 703-04, 707 S.E.2d at 366-67.
35. Id. at 703, 707 S.E.2d at 366.
36. Id. at 704, 707 S.E.2d at 367.
37. Id. at 705, 707 S.E.2d at 367.
38. 287 Ga. 242, 695 S.E.2d 255 (2010).
39. Id. at 242, 695 S.E.2d at 256.
40. 269 Ga. 478, 499 S.E.2d 60 (1998), overruled by Whitehead v. State, 287 Ga. 242,
695 S.E.2d 255 (2010).
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the court established the rule that preservation of challenges to the
introduction of similar transaction evidence under Uniform Superior
Court Rule 31.3(B)4 1 required the defendant to propound a pretrial
objection to the State's notice of intent to introduce similar transaction
evidence and then, "object[] to the introduction of the similar transaction
evidence" at trial. 42 During the reporting period, Justice Nahmias
analyzed this "repetitive objection rule[,]" which he determined is
"unique to similar transaction evidence," but without good reason.43
Noting the criticism of this rule in several Georgia Court of Appeals
opinions,44 as well as criticism from Professor Milich, the court
abandoned the repetitive objection rule, holding that objections to similar
transaction evidence should conform to all other pretrial challenges to
the admissibility of evidence, which, when properly asserted at pretrial,
preserves the challenge for appellate review.46
V.

DEFINING CAUSATION IN FELONY MURDER CASES

In the case of State v. Jackson," Carlester Jackson, Warren Smith,
and Jerold Daniels conspired to rob a drug dealer. Daniels brought a
gun, but the drug dealer, who also had a gun, shot and killed Daniels in
self-defense during the robbery. Jackson and Smith were charged with
felony murder for their co-conspirator Daniels's death.4 8 The defense
moved the trial court to dismiss the felony murder count pursuant to
State v. Crane,4 9 a twenty-nine-year-old case in which the supreme
court held, on facts almost identical to Jackson, "that the word 'causes'
in the felony murder statute requires not proximate causation, but that
the death be 'caused directly' by one of the parties to the underlying
felony."so The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed

41.

UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 31.3(B).

42. Young, 269 Ga. at 479, 499 S.E.2d at 61.
43. Whitehead, 287 Ga. at 245, 695 S.E.2d at 258.
44. Id. at 247, 695 S.E.2d at 259.
45. Id. at 248,695 S.E.2d at 260; PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE § 11.14

n.2 (2d ed. 2002).
46. Whitehead, 287 Ga. at 248-49, 695 S.E.2d at 260. Unfortunately for Mr. Whitehead,
the supreme court proceeded to analyze his similar transaction challenge but concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, thereby affirming
his conviction. Id. at 249, 695 S.E.2d at 261.
47. 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010).
48. Id. at 646-47, 697 S.E.2d at 758.
49. 247 Ga. 779,279 S.E.2d 695 (1981), overruled by State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646,697
S.E.2d 757 (2010).
50. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 646, 697 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting Crane, 247 Ga. at 779, 279
S.E.2d at 696).
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pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(aX1)," asking the supreme court to
reverse Crane."
In a 4-3 decision, the supreme court reversed Crane.3 The opinion,
written by Justice Nahmias, provided that the question in Jackson was
"whether a defendant who commits a felony whose intended victim kills
a co-conspirator 'causes' that death."5 4 The majority noted that "the
term 'cause' is customarily interpreted in almost all legal contexts to
mean 'proximate cause'-'[tlhat which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
55
The
and without which the result would not have occurred.'
majority then cited cases to support the conclusion that, even in
6
homicide cases, proximate cause is the standard.
The majority wrote that if it were not for Crane, the case would have
been easy to decide." But Crane had to be analyzed and discarded in
order to reach the decision in Jackson. The majority concluded that the
court in Crane got it wrong when it determined that "cause" meant
directly or indirectly caused the death, and, given this interpretation, the
rule of lenity required the court in Crane to say that the statute meant
The present court concluded that its
directly caused the death."
predecessors had erroneously jumped to this conclusion and completely
failed to consider proximate cause."9
Since Crane got it wrong and has been inconsistently applied over the
years, the supreme court reversed, holding that "Crane is ... no longer
good law."o The majority wrote in defense of this reversal against
concerns that stare decisis and the silence of the legislature for nearly
three decades weighed against it."1 With respect to stare decisis,
Justice Nahmias wrote: "In considering whether to reexamine a prior
erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having the
question decided against the importance of having it decided right."62

51. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(1) (Supp. 2011).
52. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648, 697 S.E.2d at 758-59.
53. Id. at 660, 697 S.E.2d at 767.
54. Id. at 648, 697 S.E.2d at 759.
55. Id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (5th ed. 1979).
56. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 649, 697 S.E.2d at 759 (citing James v. State, 250 Ga. 655, 655,
300 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1983)).
57. Id. at 652-53, 697 S.E.2d at 761-62.
58. Id. at 653-54, 697 S.E.2d at 762-63 (quoting Crane, 247 Ga. at 779-80, 279 S.E.2d
at 696).
59. Id. at 654-55, 697 S.E.2d at 763-64.
60. Id. at 658, 697 S.E.2d at 766.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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The factors to be weighed include "the age of the precedent, the reliance
interests at stake, the workability of the decision, and, most importantly,
the soundness of its reasoning.'

Having concluded that Crane's reasoning was flawed, that it was
inconsistently applied-making it unworkable in practice-and that it
created no meaningful reliance interests, the majority then commented
on its age by discussing why the silence of the legislature since Crane
did not mean that the legislature has acquiesced to the correctness of
Crane." The court surmised that the legislature has been silent in
response to Crane because its inconsistent application "has not had the
sort of obviously far-reaching effects that are likely to stimulate a
In addition, legislative silence "frequently
legislative response."
betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis."
Alternatively,
the majority, in this instance, reasoned that the General Assembly would
simply not know how to address Crane and would not know what to fix
in the statute." Finally, the court concluded that it should not lay on
the legislature the responsibility to fix a mistake perpetrated by the
court itself.68
VI.

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE: AGGRAVATED STALKING

Can a single violation of a court's no-contact provision be sufficient
behavior to constitute the felony offense of aggravated stalking? In State
v. Burke," the defendant was tried and convicted for the offense of
aggravated stalking when, in violation of a permanent protective order
prohibiting Burke from having "any contact whatsoever" with his exgirlfriend, he mailed "her an envelope containing a card, a letter, and a
handwritten poem." 0 At trial, the State introduced evidence of similar
transactions showing scores of letters Burke had sent and calls he had
made that led up to the permanent protective order, but the only act
upon which the charges were based was the single act of mailing the
envelope described above."

63. Id.
64. Id. at 658-60, 697 S.E.2d at 766-67.
65. Id. at 660, 697 S.E.2d at 767.
66.

Id. at 659 n.8, 697 S.E.2d at 766 n.8 (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21

(1969)).
67. Id. at 660, 697 S.E.2d at 767.
68. Id. (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946)).
69. 287 Ga. 377, 695 S.E.2d 649 (2010).
70. Id. at 377, 695 S.E.2d at 649-50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71.

Id. at 377, 695 S.E.2d at 650.
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After conviction, appellant propounded on appeal a challenge to the
trial court's conclusion that a single violation of a protective order was
sufficient to constitute the offense of aggravated stalking.7 2 The court
of appeals agreed with the challenge and reversed the conviction." The
State appealed and the supreme court granted certiorari to consider the
question."4 The elements of the offense of aggravated stalking, set
forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a), 5 are as follows: "A person commits the
offense of aggravated stalking when such person, in violation of a ...
permanent protective order . .. contacts another person ...

without the

consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.""
The supreme court looked to the definition of the phrase "harassing
and intimidating" as set forth in the simple stalking statute" and
determined that such behavior was defined as requiring "a pattern of
harassing and intimidating behavior . . . ."" Moreover, the legislature

declared that this definition was to apply to the aggravated stalking
provision as well." As a result, the supreme court affirmed the court
of appeals by holding, "[blased upon the plain terms of the stalking
statutes, a single violation of a protective order, by itself, does not
amount to aggravated stalking.""
VII.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHARGE OF DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALPRAZOLAM

In Sandlin v. State," Jason Sandlin challenged the constitutionality
of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(aX6),8 2 which the State used to prosecute him
for driving under the influence of a controlled substance, in this case,
alprazolam (Xanax)." The court of appeals noted that Sandlin was
governed by Love v. State ,84 which struck down this statute as uncon-

72. Burke v. State, 297 Ga. App. 38, 41, 676 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2009).
73. Id. at 38, 676 S.E.2d at 767.
74. Burke, 287 Ga. at 377, 695 S.E.2d at 650.
75. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-91(a) (2011).
76. Id.
77. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90 (2011).
78. Burke, 287 Ga. at 378, 695 S.E.2d at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted);
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90(a)(1).
79. Burke, 287 Ga. at 378, 695 S.E.2d at 650.
80. Id. at 378, 695 S.E.2d at 650-51.
81. 307 Ga. App. 573, 707 S.E.2d 378 (2011).
82. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(6) (2011).
83. Sandlin, 307 Ga. App. at 573-74, 707 S.E.2d at 379.
84. 271 Ga. 398, 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999).
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stitutional on equal protection grounds." In Love, the supreme court
held that O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(6) was "unconstitutional as it pertained
to persons with detectable levels of marijuana in their systems" because
the level of "legislative distinction between users of legal and illegal
marijuana was not directly related to the public safety purpose of the
legislation.""
Likewise, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(aX6) authorizes a conviction upon proof
that a person has driven a vehicle under the influence of a controlled
substance in any amount, while O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(b)"' says that a
person can be convicted if that person "is rendered incapable of driving
safely as a result of using a drug other than alcohol which such person
is legally entitled to use."88 Since the statute "disparately treats legal
and illegal users of alprazolam," Love controlled, leading the court to
reverse Sandlin's conviction.
VIII. A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER
One is effectively absent from trial if the proceedings are conducted in
English and the accused speaks and understands only a language other
than English. For this reason, in 2005, the Georgia Supreme Court
"promulgate[d] rules establishing a statewide plan for the use of
interpreters in [courtroom] proceedings . . . "'

Failure to provide

adequate interpretation services to a non-English speaking defendant
violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,91
which provides the right to be present at all critical stages of one's
trial.9 2 The deprivation of an interpreter to an accused who needs one
also implicates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution,93 which prohibits the trial and conviction of an incompetent individual.94 Just as one is not truly "present"
if he or she cannot understand what is happening at trial because of the
language barrier, one who cannot rationally communicate with his or her

85.
S.E.2d
86.
S.E.2d
87.

Sandlin, 307 Ga. App. at 574, 707 S.E.2d at 379; see Love, 271 Ga. at 402, 517
at 57.
Sandlin, 307 Ga. App. at 574, 707 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Love, 271 Ga. at 402, 517
at 57).
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(b) (2011).

88. Sandlin, 307 Ga. App. at 574, 707 S.E.2d at 379 (internal quotation marks omitted);
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(b).
89. Sandlin, 307 Ga. App. at 574-75, 707 S.E.2d at 379-80.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Ramos v. Terry, 279 Ga. 889, 891-92, 622 S.E.2d 339, 341-42 (2005).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1.

94. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992).
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attorney or communicate effectively in English, is "no more competent
to proceed than an individual who is incompetent due to mental
incapacity.""
In Ling v. State, Annie Ling was indicted for cruelty to children in
Ling went to trial, was convicted, secured new
the first degree."
counsel, and then "filed a motion for new trial, arguing that her trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to secure an interpreter" for her
because her native language was Mandarin Chinese and she did not
understand English well enough to understand the trial proceedings or
The trial court denied
"the State's last minute plea agreement offer."
the motion, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed." The Georgia
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether Ling's presence at
trial without an interpreter rendered her, in effect, incompetent and
legally absent from the trial and whether trial counsel can be said to
render effective representation without seeking an interpreter for a nonEnglish-speaking client.o
In a 4-3 opinion, Justice Hunstein, writing for the majority, vacated
the trial court's order denying Ling's new trial and remanded the case
back to the trial court for a determination of her claim that she was not
able to understand the proceedings or the last-minute plea discusThe majority and the dissent agreed upon the law to be
sions.o10
applied in assessing the interpretation needs of a non-English-speaking
defendant and agreed that depriving such a defendant of an interpreter
could constitute constitutional violations, effectively rendering the
defendant not competent or present during the critical phases of her own
trial.102 However, the majority and dissent disagreed upon whether
the trial court carried out its duty to make the factual assessment of
Ling's needs at the hearing on the motion for new trial because the trial
judge denied the motion for new trial without findings of fact or
The dissent examined the record from the new
conclusions of law.'
trial hearing and concluded that the trial court "implicitly" made the
findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to hold that Ling did

95. Ling v. State, 288 Ga. 299, 301, 702 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2010); see Gonzalez v.
Phillips, 195 F. Supp. 2d 893, 903 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Louisiana v. Lopes, 805 So. 2d 124,
128 (La. 2001); United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
96. 288 Ga. 299, 702 S.E.2d 881 (2010).
97. Id. at 299, 702 S.E.2d at 882.
98. Id.
99. Ling v. State, 300 Ga. App. 726, 726, 686 S.E.2d 356, 356 (2009).
100. Ling, 288 Ga. at 299, 702 S.E.2d at 882.
101. Id. at 299-300, 702 S.E.2d at 882.
102. See id. at 305, 702 S.E.2d at 886 (Hines, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 303-04, 702 S.E.2d at 885.
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not need an interpreter at her trial and was, therefore, present and
competent; thus, the dissent supported a denial of her new trial
motion.'o The dissent relied upon the appellate presumption that the
trial court knows the law and faithfully and lawfully performs the duties
that the law places upon the court.105
Conversely, the majority held that a silent order denying the claims
raised in this motion for new trial was not sufficient to satisfy the
appellate court's constitutional concerns that the trial court made proper
findings of fact and conclusions of law to support a charge that a nonEnglish-speaking defendant was present and competent during her
trial.'06 Justice Hunstein stated the majority's concerns as follows:
"But when an appellate court is left to imply, assume, or surmise the
nature of the trial court's findings, its ability to guard against violations
For that reason, the
of constitutional rights is compromised."o'
supreme court established a new rule, holding that "trial courts must
state and explain their findings when an issue concerning the need for
an interpreter that implicates foundational due process rights is raised
and decided at the motion for new trial stage.",0 8 This holding now
requires trial courts to make express findings of fact in the orders they
execute concerning new trial motions wherein the issue of a client's need
for the services of an interpreter is raised.' 09
IX.

CLOSING ARGUMENTS

We include the following cases because of their lessons for trial
lawyers and trial courts in the conduct of trials and the preservation of
error for appeal. In Smith v. State,"o Sonya and Joseph Smith were
convicted for murder and other acts of violence in the death of their
eight-year-old son, Josef."' The facts proven at trial of the heinous
and unjustifiable treatment of their son were enough to support the
convictions." 2 During the State's closing argument, however, the
prosecuting attorney
"clicked" her fingers at which signal one of the deputies in the
courtroom turned out the lights and an associate prosecutor "popped

104. Id. at 304-05, 702 S.E.2d at 885-86.
105. Id. at 305, 702 S.E.2d at 886.
106.

Id. at 302, 702 S.E.2d at 884 (majority opinion).

107. Id.
108. Id. at 299, 702 S.E.2d at 882.
109. Id.
110.
111.
112.

288 Ga. 348, 703 S.E.2d 629 (2010).
Id. at 348, 703 S.E.2d at 632.
Id. at 356, 703 S.E.2d at 638.
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out a cake out of a grocery bag" complete with eight candles, which
were then lit with a lighter brought into the courtroom; the prosecutor
and her associate then proceeded to sing to "dear Josef," i.e., the
deceased victim, the celebratory words to "Happy Birthday."113
14
Court TV was in the courtroom filming the trial.
The majority concluded that counsel for the defense was not ineffective
in failing to object to the "prosecutor's antics" by making a strategic
decision that the "'Happy Birthday' song was so 'preposterous,' 'absurd,'
and 'over the top' that 'it would turn the jurors off,' and that he should
1
not call any more attention to it by objecting to it."n The court did
not commit error by failing to stop the prosecutor's actions even without
a defense objection, moreover, even though it "would have been well
within its right to control the courtroom by putting an end to the display
of the prosecutor.""'
In her dissent, Justice Hunstein, joined by Justice Benham, wrote that
"judges have not only the right to control their courtrooms," as the
majority noted, but "they have the duty to do so.""' In Justice Hunstein's view, that duty in this case required the court to stop the
prosecutor's antics even without a defense objection."' The birthday
stunt "offended the dignity and decorum of the court and violated every
precept of professionalism and fair play. Yet the trial court did
absolutely nothing. The event played itself out without the trial judge
9
performing his duty to maintain decorum in the courtroom."n The
dissent reasoned that the court should have rebuked the prosecutor, told
the jury to "ignore the spectacle," then charged the jury "that sympathy
20
Instead, "he took
for the victim was to play no role in their verdict."
his courtroom
turning
from
prosecutor
out-of-control
an
to
stop
action
no
behavior.""'
unprofessional
for
her
stage
a
theater
into
The dissent also believed that it was ineffective for defense counsel to
have failed to object.'

113. Id. at 358, 703 S.E.2d at 639 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 359 n.6, 703 S.E.2d at 639 n.6. At the hearing on the motion for new trial,
defense counsel stated: "I understand the cameras were rolling and everybody wants to
be Nancy Grace's friend." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. at 354-55, 703 S.E.2d at 636-37 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 356, 703 S.E.2d at 637.
117. Id. at 357, 703 S.E.2d at 638 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 359, 703 S.E.2d at 640-41.
120. Id. at 359, 703 S.E.2d at 640.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 360, 703 S.E.2d at 640.
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A reasonable attorney does not stand by silently and allow the prosecutor to figuratively toss the victim into the jury box, with the resulting
prejudice to counsel's clients, out of concern that an objection essential
to protecting the impartiality of the jury might "give the impression"
that he was "disruptive." No reasonable attorney would sacrifice a
client's fundamental right to a fair trial for such a ridiculous reason. 123
In addition, the dissent disagreed with the majority's view that it was
a reasonable strategy for the defense counsel to sit by silently figuring
that the prosecutor's stunt would backfire on her.12 1
The prosecutor's stunt was intended to evoke sympathy for the victim
so that the jury, diverted from the facts, would return a verdict based
on passion, not the evidence and the law. How is it "reasonable"
strategy for defense counsel to use the prosecutor's improper stunt to
elicit the opposite but equally improper effect in the jury?125
While the prosecutor's theatrics and "unprofessional attempt to obtain
guilty verdicts at any cost"2' did not result in a reversal in this case,
both the majority and the dissent disapproved of this sort of demeaning
behavior by a lawyer in a criminal trial.1 27

The case of O'Neal v. State1 2 8 dealt with a challenge to the State's
closing argument, in which the prosecutor in an armed robbery trial
stated: "I'm going to invite y'all to come back to DeKalb County Superior
Court courtroom-you can come to this courtroom or any of the other
Superior courtrooms-watch trials for the next year. Okay. Come back
and see how many times we have this much evidence."129 The defense
objected, the court sustained the objection, the defense requested a
curative instruction to be given to the jury, but the trial judge merely
said, "All right. All right. Just proceed on.""3 o The court of appeals,
in an unpublished opinion, held that O'Neal waived the issue of the
court's failure to give a curative instruction because he did not get a
ruling from the court denying his request.''

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 359 n.6, 703 S.E.2d at 639 n.6.
Id. at 356, 362, 703 S.E.2d at 637, 642.
288 Ga. 219, 702 S.E.2d 288 (2010).
Id. at 219, 702 S.E.2d at 289-90.
Id. at 219, 702 S.E.2d at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 219-20, 702 S.E.2d at 290.
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The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on this issue,
however, holding that O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75132 is plain: the trial judge
had a duty to give a curative instruction; the defense made a proper
objection, and based upon "recent precedents interpreting the statute,"
the objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.133 When
a proper objection has been made, as it was here, the trial court then
has a duty to rebuke the offending lawyer and give curative instructions,
or if a rebuke and instructions are insufficient to cure the harm, then
the trial court is to declare a mistrial."' Yet, in this case, the supreme
court concluded that the error was harmless because "it is highly
probable that the trial court's error did not contribute to the verdict."as
X.

PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The Council of Superior Court Judges promulgates pattern jury
instructions to be read to the jury in an effort to provide them the rules
necessary to consider the evidence presented and reach a proper
verdict.'
In State v. Hobbs,3 1 the pattern jury instruction for good
character of the defendant was the subject of appeal.' 8 Hobbs was
convicted of rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual
battery, child molestation, and cruelty to children for offenses he was
accused of committing against his daughter."
Hobbs presented
evidence of his good character during his case-in-chief, so he sought and
was granted a jury instruction on good character. What Hobbs
requested, however, was the pattern jury instruction.'
The trial
court ruled that the pattern charge on good character was "improperly
argumentative," so the court crafted a charge on good character, modeled
132. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-75 (2008). The statute states the following:
Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters
which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the
same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all
needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper
impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the
prosecuting attorney is the offender.
Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.

O'Neal, 288 Ga. at 220, 702 S.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 221, 702 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 223, 702 S.E.2d at 292.
See COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, VOL. II: CRIMINAL CASES (4th ed. 2007).
137. 288 Ga. 551, 705 S.E.2d 147 (2011).
138. 288 Ga. at 551, 705 S.E.2d at 148.
139. Id. at 553-54, 705 S.E.2d at 149 (Melton, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 551, 705 S.E.2d at 148 (majority opinion).
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after Sapp v. State,'4 ' a Georgia Supreme Court opinion. 4 2 Trial
counsel preserved his objection to this charge.14' The Georgia Court
of Appeals agreed that the trial court's charge was insufficient and held
that the error required reversal of Hobbs's conviction. 44 The Georgia
Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
The court of appeals found two errors with the trial court's instruction:
first, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that they "may"
consider the good character evidence while the pattern instruction stated
that they "should[,]" and second, the trial court's charge failed to include
the instruction that good character was a substantive fact, sufficient on
its own "to create a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused." 46
The supreme court affirmed the reversal of the conviction, but only upon
the second prong.
Justice Benham, writing for the four-justice majority, and Justice
Melton, writing for the three-justice dissent, agreed that the court of
appeals erred in its first holding concerning the trial court's charge. 148
The trial court instructed the jury that "[wihen evidence of good
character is admitted, you may consider it in determining whether or not
you have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused." 4 Yet the
pattern charge provides that "[wihen evidence of the good character of
the defendant is offered, the jury has the duty to consider that testimony
... in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant."5 o The
court of appeals held that the difference between the charge given and
the pattern charge required reversal of the conviction.'"' The supreme
court determined that this holding was erroneous because the language
from the case upon which the pattern jury instruction was predicated,
Sapp, tracks the language of the instruction that the trial court gave to
the jury.'" The court in Hobbs, relying on Sapp, stated that "[wihenever a defendant's good character is introduced at trial and the

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
at 700)
147.
148.
149.
150.

271 Ga. 446, 520 S.E.2d 462 (1999).
Hobbs, 288 Ga. at 554-55, 705 S.E.2d at 149-50 (Melton, J., dissenting).
Hobbs v. State, 299 Ga. App. 521, 523 n.10, 682 S.E.2d 697, 700 n.10 (2009).
Id. at 521, 682 S.E.2d at 698.
Hobbs, 288 Ga. at 551, 705 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 552, 705 S.E.2d at 148 (quoting Hobbs, 299 Ga. App. at 523-24, 682 S.E.2d
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 552-53, 705 S.E.2d at 148-49.
Id. at 553, 705 S.E.2d at 149 (Melton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 551-52, 705 S.E.2d at 148 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
Id. at 551 n.1, 705 S.E.2d at 148 n.1 (emphasis added); COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR
COURT JUDGES, supra note 136, at § 3.35.10.
151. Hobbs, 288 Ga. at 552, 705 S.E.2d at 148.
152.

Id.
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defendant timely requests a charge on good character, the trial court
must instruct the jury that it 'may consider good character evidence in
its deliberations.'"" 3 Tracking the language of Sapp, as the trial court
did here, was sufficient.15 4
It was the significance of the absence of the rest of the court's holding
5
The court
in Sapp that the supreme court justices disagreed upon.
of appeals also held that the trial court's good character instruction was
deficient because it omitted the following critical language from the
pattern jury instruction, also tracking the holding in Sapp: "Good
character is a positive, substantive fact and may be sufficient to produce
in the minds of a jury a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
The majority and dissent agreed that it was not
defendant."'"'
necessary for the trial court to give the pattern jury charge verbatim,
but disagreed upon the significance of the absence of this critical
statement of the law. 57 Determining that the trial court did not
adequately charge on good character, the majority affirmed the court of
58
appeals in reversing Hobbs's conviction.'
The dissent criticized the holding, stating that the majority was
"creating new law" by requiring the adherence to the pattern jury
instruction because the trial court's charge, the dissent argued,
sufficiently tracked the law set forth in Sapp.s 9 The dissent noted
that the majority failed to address whether the charge, even if erroneous,
constituted harmful and, therefore, reversible error, as the court of
appeals held. 6 o The dissent disagreed that the language at issue was
essential to the holding in Sapp, which meant the dissent concluded that
the majority was now elevating a pattern jury instruction over the actual
requirements of the law.'' Neither the majority nor the dissent
addressed the reason that the trial court had given for not using the
language in the pattern instruction, and neither the majority nor the
dissent addressed the sufficiency and strength of the evidence of Hobbs's
good character.
The pattern jury instruction for good character remains intact.
However, practitioners must be aware that, while the trial court has

153.

Id. (quoting Sapp, 271 Ga. at 448, 520 S.E.2d at 465).

154.

Id.

155. Id. at 553, 705 S.E.2d at 149 (Melton, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 551 & n.1, 552, 705 S.E.2d at 148 & n.1 (majority opinion); COUNCIL OF
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, supra note 136.
157. Hobbs, 288 Ga. at 553, 705 S.E.2d at 149 (Melton, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (majority opinion).
159. Id. (Melton, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 554, 705 S.E.2d at 150.
161. See id. at 553, 705 S.E.2d at 149.
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some leeway concerning the exact method of conveying it to the jury, it
is now mandatory that the court instruct the jury that good character is
a substantive fact and may, on its own, be sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

